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Moones Mellouli lawfully entered the United 
States in 2004 on a student visa. He earned under-
graduate and graduate degrees with distinction, taught 
mathematics at the University of Missouri-Columbia, 
became a lawful permanent resident (LPR) and got en-
gaged to a U.S. citizen. In 2010, Mellouli pleaded guilty 
to possession of a sock as drug paraphernalia in Kansas 
state court, a misdemeanor offense. After he success-
fully completed probation in 2012, the federal immi-
gration enforcement agency put him in deportation 
proceedings pursuant to a statutory ground of removal 
targeting controlled substance offenses. Ineligible for 
discretionary adjudicative relief under current law, 
Mellouli was deported. When his appeal finally reached 
the Supreme Court in 2015, the justices reversed.1 
The government’s deportation of Mellouli for pos-
session of a sock, and the Court’s subsequent reversal 
of the agency, reflect the remarkable transformation of 
immigration law that has occurred in the United States 
over the last two decades. This article discusses the shift 
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following an administrative proceeding, 
that the noncitizen does not have a right 
to remain in the country. 
For much of immigration law’s his-
tory, immigration judges presiding over 
deportation proceedings were statutorily 
empowered to weigh a noncitizen’s posi-
tive and negative factors before entering 
an order of removal.3 Where, on balance, 
deportation would be overly harsh in 
light of mitigating factors, immigration 
judges often had the equitable discretion 
to suspend or set it aside. Criminal law 
judges, too, had the authority to issue a 
sentencing “recommendation,” consid-
ered binding on federal authorities, that 
deportation not follow from a criminal 
conviction in light of the defendant’s in-
dividualized circumstances.4 Moreover, 
for most of the 20th century criminal 
history did not play a major role in deter-
mining the deportability of noncitizens. 
Congress enacted the first criminal re-
moval ground in 1917, for persons con-
victed of a “crime involving moral tur-
pitude,” but this applied only within the 
first five years of the noncitizen’s entry 
and only if a prison sentence of at least 
one year was imposed.5 Over the years, 
Congress gradually expanded the crimi-
nal offenses that would lead to deporta-
tion, but removal on the basis of criminal 
history remained relatively rare—about 7 
percent of all deportations.6 
In the late 20th century, however, 
Congress enacted a series of laws that 
precipitated a dramatic shift in immi-
gration law.7 Extensive revisions to the 
immigration code made all unauthorized 
presence a deportable offense (though 
not a criminal infraction) and also sig-
nificantly multiplied and broadened the 
categories of criminal offenses triggering 
deportation for lawful present nonciti-
zens.8 Simultaneously, Congress drasti-
cally reduced the statutory authority for 
immigration law judges and criminal 
sentencing judges to make equitable de-
terminations about the appropriateness 
of deportation in individual cases. A few 
discretionary forms of relief remain, but 
they are exceedingly difficult to qualify 
for.9 As a result, many criminal offenses 
that are treated quite lightly under state 
penal laws—for example, petty shoplift-
from a deportation system that previously 
allowed for more formal adjudicative-dis-
cretion to one in which state and federal 
enforcement officials bear primary respon-
sibility for assessing proportionality and 
fairness through discretionary enforce-
ment decisions regarding both lawfully and 
unlawfully present noncitizens. That shift, 
toward what I call enforcement-based eq-
uity, has exerted increasing influence on 
executive branch actions in immigration 
law as well as the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
recent immigration jurisprudence.2 
A Brief Primer on Deportation Law
In general, deportation rules target two 
groups of noncitizens. One consists of 
persons who are deportable on the ba-
sis of being present in the United States 
without authorization. Another consists 
of lawfully present noncitizens who be-
come deportable after being convicted of 
certain offenses or engaging in other pro-
hibited behavior (e.g., unauthorized em-
ployment or unlawful voting). A depor-
tation order signifies the formal ejection 
of a noncitizen falling into one of these 
groups from the United States. Generally 
speaking, it is a civil legal determination, 
In general, deportation rules target two 
groups of noncitizens. One consists of 
persons who are deportable on the basis 
of being present in the United States 
without authorization. Another consists 
of lawfully present noncitizens who 
become deportable after being convicted 
of certain offenses or engaging in other 
prohibited behavior (e.g., unauthorized 
employment or unlawful voting).
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ing, turnstile jumping and minor mari-
juana possession offenses—now can trig-
ger detention, deportation, and lengthy 
or permanent bars on lawful return, 
with little room for immigration judges 
to balance equitable factors, even for 
long-term LPRs.10 In fact, under current 
law even convictions that have been fully 
pardoned, expunged or entered but de-
ferred pending completion of diversion-
ary programs in many cases can continue 
to result in immigration consequences.11
At the same time, the size of the popu-
lation deportable on the basis of unlaw-
ful presence has grown to more than 11 
million, two-thirds of whom apparently 
have lived in the United States for over a 
decade.12 The reach of modern deporta-
tion law is thus vast, with many millions 
of foreign nationals in the United States 
potentially subject to enforcement actions 
despite longstanding community ties.
The Rise of Enforcement-Based 
Equity
Although immigration is a controversial 
and frequently divisive topic, most would 
agree that a deportation is a life-altering 
event. To be sure, the severity will depend 
on the particular situation of the affected 
individual, but, generally speaking, few 
civil penalties exceed the impact that ban-
ishment has for many noncitizens, as well 
as their families and communities. The 
removal of a noncitizen from the United 
States commonly results in lengthy or 
permanent separation from children and 
spouse, significant economic hardship 
and the possibility of harm in the country 
of return. In the Supreme Court’s words, 
“deportation may result in the loss of all 
that makes life worth living.”13
On the other hand, immigration rules 
are intended to further undoubtedly sig-
nificant interests. Such goals include pub-
lic safety and national security, economic 
productivity (including the labor needs of 
U.S. employers as well as the protection 
of U.S. citizens’ and lawfully present im-
migrants’ economic interests), the priori-
tization of particular family relationships 
and the capacity to extend humanitarian 
relief to refugees and others. Deportation 
controls are ostensibly intended to re-
move from American society those non-
citizens who pose threats or shirk rules. 
The central challenge of our deporta-
tion system is the balance of these compet-
ing concerns. On the one hand are a de-
portable noncitizen’s positive equities and 
mitigating factors, including the strength 
of family and community ties, the length 
of residence in the United States, econom-
ic contributions, general moral character, 
hardship or danger faced in the country of 
return and so on. On the other hand are 
the noncitizen’s transgressions, including 
the nature and recency of any criminal ac-
tivity or the frequency and egregiousness 
of any immigration violations. 
This concern, raised by any legal sys-
tem that administers significant sanc-
tions, reflects the principle of propor-
tionality. Proportionality refers to the fit 
between the gravity of the underlying of-
fenses, tempered by any mitigating or ex-
acerbating factors, and the severity of the 
sanction.14 To be sure, there is no univer-
sal agreement about the point at which a 
given penalty becomes disproportionate. 
Nevertheless, most lawyers, scholars and 
jurists accept that enforcers or enforce-
ment systems should be sensitive to spe-
cial cases and that at some point the gap 
between the consequences of deportation 
for an affected individual and the nature 
of the underlying violations becomes too 
wide, raising proportionality problems. 
As discussed above, in the 1990s Con-
gress dramatically widened the net of de-
portability while constraining back-end, 
formal adjudicative discretion. Neverthe-
less, removing equitable discretionary au-
thority from the purview of judges does 
not necessarily excise all consideration 
of fairness from the deportation system. 
Instead, Congress’s expansion of deport-
ability grounds and contraction of back-
end adjudicative equity may simply have 
shifted power (and, some might argue, 
responsibility) to police, prosecutors and 
federal enforcers to evaluate proportion-
ality concerns at the front-end stages of 
the process. 
This phenomenon has long been rec-
ognized in the criminal law field, where 
one consequence of enacting broad, in-
flexible penal statutes and mandatory 
sentencing guidelines is to transfer eq-
uitable power to law enforcement police 
and prosecutors, who act as the criminal 
system’s normative gatekeepers.15 Leg-
islators have incentives to increase the 
severity of penal laws, relying on po-
lice and prosecutors to exercise discre-
tion in determining who to arrest and 
prosecute, so that criminal law is appro-
priately and proportionally applied to 
individual human beings. Discretion is 
thus critical to temper and refine broad 
criminal statutes.
Similarly, in the immigration context, 
Congress’s expansion of the grounds for 
removal, in conjunction with the narrow-
ing of adjudicative discretionary author-
ity, effectively (if not intentionally) trans-
ferred substantial gate-keeping power to 
the deportation system’s enforcement 
officials. Notably, when media accounts 
began highlighting stories of the immi-
gration agency’s indiscriminate enforce-
ment against long-time lawful permanent 
residents of the harsher statutory provi-
sions enacted in 1996, many of the same 
legislators who had voted for the revi-
sions wrote a letter to the attorney gen-
eral urging more systematic prosecutorial 
discretion in order to avoid “unfair” de-
portations and “unjustifiable hardship.”16 
Modern immigration law delegates 
wide authority to the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) to determine 
enforcement priorities.17 The vast num-
ber of potential enforcement targets is 
also relevant. Even as laws and attitudes 
about undocumented workers and immi-
gration enforcement have become more 
stringent, Congress’s budgetary appro-
priations in recent years to the Executive’s 
immigration agencies permit the removal 
of only a small fraction of the total num-
ber of noncitizens who may be deportable 
on the basis of unlawful presence, crimi-
nal history or other infractions.18 Thus, 
even as the Obama Administration actu-
alized more than 2.5 million removals—
far more than any other administration in 
history19—these were a drop in the bucket 
relative to the size of the pool. This mas-
sive underfunding, coupled with the 
breadth of modern deportation categories 
and the constriction of back-end discre-
tion, suggests that Congress depends on 
the Executive to set priorities and exercise 
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discretion when determining which per-
centage of the total removable population 
to target. President Trump has indicated a 
desire to increase deportations and deten-
tion above Obama’s numbers, and it re-
mains to be seen whether Congress will 
significantly increase the appropriations 
necessary to do so.
Recent Efforts at Enforcement-
Based Equity in the Executive 
Branch
Under President Obama, DHS endeav-
ored to implement enforcement-based 
equity in specific ways. I will highlight 
two such efforts here. First, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security prioritized 
enforcement against recent border-
crossers and noncitizens who encounter 
criminal justice systems. Although not all 
deportations of persons within these cat-
egories will be proportional, prioritizing 
limited resources in this way does lessen 
the likelihood of enforcement against 
non-targeted groups, whom the govern-
ment may believe are likely to present 
more significant equitable claims. Non-
citizens who have already been living in 
the United States for some time, and who 
have avoided contact with the criminal 
justice system, are more likely to have de-
veloped ties and relationships that might 
militate against removal. 
As a result of this strategy, border re-
movals under the Obama Administration 
dramatically increased as a percentage of 
overall removals—something on the or-
der of 66 percent in recent years.20 Simi-
larly, nearly half of recent deportees had 
at least some kind of criminal history.21 
As discussed below, the Supreme Court 
appears to believe, as do many scholars 
and advocates, that the executive branch’s 
approach to the removal of noncitizens 
with criminal history has been overly 
coarse. And by and large, the vast major-
ity of those whom DHS terms “criminal 
aliens” have been convicted only of traf-
fic offenses, low-level drug possession 
or crimes of migration (illegal entry or 
re-entry). Nevertheless, the Obama Ad-
ministration’s focus on noncitizens who 
encounter the criminal justice system—
which the Trump Administration has in-
dicated it will continue to pursue—does 
increase the likelihood that those put in 
removal proceedings will have negative 
factors justifying deportation. 
Second, DHS in recent years has in-
creased the use of prosecutorial discretion 
in immigration enforcement, on both a 
case-by-case level and more categorically. 
In 2011, John Morton, then-director of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), began the roll-out of a series of 
agency initiatives aimed at encouraging 
more systematic use of prosecutorial dis-
cretion. Through memoranda and train-
ings, agency leaders set out various posi-
tive and negative factors to be balanced 
in the exercise of discretion. Over time 
the agency tinkered with the criteria and 
priorities, but the consistent focus was on 
encouraging front-line operatives to tar-
get noncitizens with criminal history or 
significant immigration violations, and to 
consider forbearance in cases with com-
pelling humanitarian factors. 
These prosecutorial discretion initia-
tives met with significant resistance by 
front-line operatives. In fact, one of ICE’s 
unions sued the agency, and refused to 
allow its 7,700 members to engage in 
agency training on the use of prosecu-
torial discretion. ICE’s prosecutors—the 
trial attorneys who represent the govern-
ment in deportation proceedings—did not 
engage in organized resistance, and over 
time many increased their use of equi-
table discretion. But the results of these 
efforts nationwide varied wildly, with a 
small handful of immigration court juris-
dictions representing the majority of dis-
cretionary case closures.22 Many similarly 
situated jurisdictions saw dramatically 
different closure rates.23 
Deferred Action for Childhood Ar-
rivals (DACA), announced in 2012, rep-
resented the agency’s attempt to shift 
toward more systematic and categorical 
implementation of enforcement discre-
tion. DACA focuses on one of the most 
sympathetic groups of undocumented 
noncitizens—longtime residents who 
were brought to the United States at a 
young age, demonstrate potential for 
economic productivity and lack indicia 
of dangerousness or wrong-doing. Such 
individuals have been acculturated as 
Americans and have little or no culpabil-
ity in their immigration violations, thus 
bringing the current system’s potential 
for disproportionality into sharp relief. 
Instead of the reactive, case-by-case ap-
proach of the earlier prosecutorial discre-
tion initiatives, DACA encourages those 
individuals who can meet the specified 
criteria to announce themselves to the 
agency for consideration for “deferred 
action,” which amounts to a revocable as-
surance that the individual will not be a 
priority for removal for a period of time.24 
It is some indication of the highly sym-
pathetic circumstances of DACA-eligible 
noncitizens that the Trump Administra-
tion has decided not to end the program, 
instead allowing recipients to retain de-
ferred action until their grant periods ex-
pire. In other respects, the new adminis-
tration is likely to change the enforcement 
approach. In particular, DHS Secretary 
John Kelly has issued new memoranda 
that largely abandon the Obama-era pros-
ecutorial discretion guidelines as agency-
wide policy. Consequently, the exercise of 
discretion in individual cases currently is 
in a phase of uncertainty and change. 
Enforcement-Based Equity  
in the Supreme Court
In recent years, the Supreme Court has 
come to grips with this new reality of 
enforcement-based equity in the depor-
tation system. In fact, concerns about the 
system’s potential for disproportional-
ity appear to have influenced much of 
the Court’s recent jurisprudence in this 
area, although the Court likely is far from 
recognizing a substantive proportional-
ity principle. Here I will highlight a few 
of the leading cases that appear to be 
animated by the Court’s equity concerns 
about the operation of the current remov-
al and enforcement scheme. 
Arizona v. United States
On June 22, 2012, the Supreme Court de-
cided Arizona v. United States, which clari-
fied the federal government’s primacy in 
the area of immigration enforcement, al-
though preserving some room for state 
activity.25 The Court struck down on 
preemption grounds most of the chal-
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lenged provisions of Arizona’s omni-
bus law, SB 1070, which essentially had 
created a state-level branch of the fed-
eral immigration enforcement system. 
For present purposes, most remarkable 
about Justice Kennedy’s majority opin-
ion is its direct acknowledgement that 
equity in the deportation scheme today 
depends almost entirely on the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion.
Justice Kennedy first explained that a 
“principle feature of the removal system is 
the broad discretion exercised by immigra-
tion officials.”26 It is worthwhile to appre-
ciate the clarity of the Court’s understand-
ing—and endorsement—of the connection 
between federal agencies’ exercise of pros-
ecutorial discretion and the implementa-
tion of equity in the deportation system:
??????????????????????????????????????????????
decide whether it makes sense to pursue 
removal at all. . . . Discretion in the en-
forcement of immigration law em-
braces immediate human concerns. 
Unauthorized workers trying to sup-
port their families, for example, likely 
pose less danger than alien smugglers or 
aliens who commit a serious crime. The 
equities of an individual case may turn 
on many factors, including whether the 
alien has children born in the United 
States, long ties to the community, or a 
record of distinguished military service 
. . . . Returning an alien to his own country 
may be deemed inappropriate even where 
??????? ???????????? ?????????????????????
fails to meet the criteria for admission.27
The Court in Arizona thus acknowl-
edged that not all noncitizens made 
deportable by Congress are similarly 
situated, and that, as a result, executive 
enforcement officials should weigh indi-
vidual equities in determining the appro-
priateness of removal in particular cases. 
This stark endorsement of the central role 
of enforcement discretion in the modern 
deportation scheme—including discretion 
not to pursue persons who are formally 
removable—set the stage for the Court’s 
preemption analysis of the challenged 
provisions of SB 1070. Throughout its 
discussion, the Court’s analysis reflected 
its concern that the challenged statutory 
provisions would enable state or local 
authorities to negate the federal govern-
ment’s determination not to penalize 
certain removable individuals, whether 
resulting from case-by-case evaluation or 
macro-enforcement priorities.28
Padilla v. Kentucky
As described above, the Obama adminis-
tration’s immigration enforcement agency 
largely declined to differentiate among 
so-called “criminal aliens,” treating almost 
any kind of criminal history as an irrefut-
able signifier of undesirability. All indica-
tions are that the Trump administration 
will take an even more expansive ap-
proach. Recent rulings, however, suggest 
that overly aggressive enforcement of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA) 
criminal law provisions troubles the Court.
The justices’ discomfort with the in-
flexible operation and harsh consequences 
of current deportation rules was perhaps 
most apparent in its 2010 decision in Pa-
dilla v. Kentucky, which took the unusual 
step of regulating an aspect of the removal 
system through a constitutional criminal 
procedure ruling.29 Relying on erroneous 
advice from his attorney, Jose Padilla (a 
long-time lawful permanent resident) 
pled guilty to a criminal charge that all but 
guaranteed his deportation. The Court’s 
watershed holding in that case—that the 
Sixth Amendment requires criminal de-
fense counsel to render effective advice 
about the potential immigration con-
sequences of a conviction—was firmly 
rooted in the new realities of federal im-
migration law, including the evisceration 
of opportunities for leniency in the face of 
criminal convictions.
The Court noted that for much of the 
20th century the grounds of criminal 
removal were narrow, and zeroed in on 
the fact that “immigration reforms over 
time have expanded the class of deport-
able offenses and limited the authority of 
judges to alleviate the harsh consequences 
of deportation.”30 Justice Stevens’ majority 
opinion emphasized the more recent loss 
of mitigating mechanisms at both federal 
and state levels, which he described as 
“critically important . . . to minimize the 
risk of unjust deportation.”31 As a result, 
“the drastic measure of deportation . . . is 
now virtually inevitable for a vast number 
of noncitizens convicted of crimes.”32
It would be constitutionally unfair, 
the Court reasoned, to allow persons to 
plead guilty without being aware that 
the penalty of deportation would fol-
low. Rooted in the Sixth Amendment’s 
command that criminal defendants be 
afforded adequate assistance of counsel, 
the decision puts constitutional obliga-
tions only on criminal defense attor-
neys. Practically, however, the ruling 
will pressure prosecutors and judges 
to ensure that defense attorneys have 
adequately advised their clients so that 
convictions cannot later be undone on 
ineffective assistance grounds. Recog-
nizing that equitable discretion in the 
removal system has shifted to earlier, 
enforcement stages, Justice Stevens also 
expressed the hope that the Court’s Sixth 
Amendment ruling would encourage de-
fense attorneys and prosecutors to take 
immigration consequences into account 
when engaging in plea bargaining.33 
The Categorical Approach Cases
Padilla established a structure for non-
citizen defendants to reach plea deals that 
avoid deportation, or that preserve nar-
row possibilities for equitable discretion-
ary relief in later deportation proceedings. 
Another set of cases decided over the last 
decade have worked toward the same ob-
jective by narrowing the range of criminal 
convictions that trigger mandatory re-
moval. For the most part, these decisions 
have concerned noncitizens with minor 
drug-related convictions that, while given 
lenient treatment under state law, were 
charged as “aggravated felony” deporta-
tion grounds by ICE prosecutors—a cat-
egorization that would foreclose any pos-
sibility of discretionary relief.34 The name 
is something of a misnomer, as many 
convictions falling within this category 
are neither aggravated nor felonies.35 The 
Court has rejected many of the govern-
ments’ overzealous efforts by requiring a 
categorical match between the elements 
of the criminal offense and the removal 
ground.36 Through these rulings, the 
Court has reigned in the harshest inter-
pretations of the criminal removal provi-
sions and safeguarded at least limited op-
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portunities for equitable decision-making 
in deportation proceedings. 
In Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, for ex-
ample, the government argued that Cara-
churi-Rosendo’s two minor state-law drug 
possession crimes would have made him a 
felony recidivist drug offender under the 
Controlled Substances Act, had he been 
federally prosecuted, therefore constitut-
ing an aggravated felony.37 The Court 
focused on the need to preserve prosecu-
torial discretion in the conviction-to-re-
moval pipeline. Federal procedure allows 
prosecutors to choose, in the exercise of 
discretion, whether to seek a recidivist en-
hancement. Many state codes afford state 
prosecutors similar discretion. The Court 
found that allowing immigration judges 
to apply their own recidivist enhance-
ments “would denigrate the independent 
judgment of state prosecutors.”38 In Car-
achuri-Rosendo’s own criminal case, the 
prosecutor chose to abandon the recidivist 
enhancement. One can only speculate on 
the prosecutor’s motives for doing so, but 
the Court’s ruling ensured that such mea-
sures by government attorneys will limit 
the impact of the conviction in subsequent 
immigration proceedings. 
The Court employed a similar approach 
in ?????????????? ?????.39 Adrian Moncrief-
fe, a long-time lawful permanent resi-
dent with two U.S. citizen children, was 
stopped for a driving offense in Georgia 
and arrested for possessing a small amount 
of marijuana. He pleaded guilty as a first-
time offender to possession of marijuana 
with intent to distribute. ICE asserted that 
Moncreiffe’s conviction triggered the “il-
licit trafficking” aggravated felony ground 
of removal, which categorization would 
take equitable discretion away from the 
immigration judge.40
In a 7 to 2 decision, the Court reject-
ed the government’s position, creating 
space for a discretionary judgment by 
an immigration judge about the justifi-
ability of Moncrieffe’s deportation. The 
Court again emphasized the categorical 
analysis that should be employed to de-
termine the immigration consequences of 
criminal convictions. A “state offense is a 
categorical match with a generic federal 
offense only if a conviction of the state of-
fense necessarily involved . . . facts equat-
Padilla established a structure for 
noncitizen defendants to reach plea 
deals that avoid deportation, or that 
preserve narrow possibilities for 
equitable discretionary relief in later 
deportation proceedings. 
ing to the generic federal offense.”41 The 
noncitizen’s actual conduct, the Court ex-
plained, is not relevant to the categorical 
approach. Instead, courts “must presume 
that the conviction rested upon nothing 
more than the least of the acts criminal-
ized, and then determine whether even 
those acts are encompassed by the generic 
federal offense.”42 If the state statute crim-
inalizes conduct that is broader than the 
generic federal offense referenced in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, there is 
an insufficient match between the offens-
es to warrant imposition of the relevant 
removal ground.
The state conviction at issue in Mon-
??????? was an insufficient match with the 
aggravated felony drug trafficking cat-
egory because the cross-referenced fed-
eral statute captured both felonious sale 
and misdemeanor distribution (defined as 
social sharing of a small amount of mari-
juana for no remuneration). Although 
the government argued that the federal 
scheme treated misdemeanor distribu-
tion as a sentencing exception, the Court 
still found the approach excessive. Some 
state-law marijuana distribution convic-
tions would unambiguously correspond 
only with federal misdemeanors, involv-
ing just a small amount of marijuana and 
no remuneration.
The underlying problem was that law-
fully present noncitizens whose conduct 
was not egregious would find themselves 
subject to a mandatory removal category 
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without any possibility of equitable bal-
ancing. The Court concluded its opinion 
in ???????????by chiding the government 
for its unduly aggressive approach to the 
criminal deportation provisions, espe-
cially with respect to the removal of LPRs 
with minor criminal history:
This is the third time in seven years 
that we have considered whether the 
Government has properly character-
ized a low-level drug offense as “illicit 
trafficking in a controlled substance,” 
and thus an “aggravated felony.” Once 
again we hold that the Government’s 
approach defies “the commonsense 
conception” of these terms.43
In Mellouli, mentioned at the outset 
of this article, the Court similarly re-
jected the government’s scorched-earth 
approach to seeking the deportation of 
LPRs with minor drug crimes. Following 
an arrest for driving offenses, Moones 
Mellouli was detained. After officers dis-
covered four Adderall pills in his sock, the 
state charged him with trafficking contra-
band in jail. A deal was later struck, and 
the amended complaint to which Mellouli 
pleaded guilty charged only the lesser of-
fense of possessing drug paraphernalia—a 
sock—and did not identify the substance 
that the officers had seized.44 
In another 7-2 decision, authored by 
Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that Mel-
louli’s drug paraphernalia conviction was 
not a removable offense. First, the Court 
noted that federal law does not criminal-
ize simple possession of drug parapher-
nalia. In addition, federal law defines 
drug paraphernalia, for purposes of non-
possessory crimes such as production or 
trafficking, as “any ‘equipment, product, 
or material’ which is ‘primarily intended or 
designed for use’ in connection with vari-
ous drug-related activities,” in contrast to 
“common household or ready-to-wear 
items like socks.”45 Justice Ginsburg also 
observed that in 19 states Mellouli’s con-
duct would not even have been deemed a 
criminal offense.
Immigration officials’ theory for Mel-
louli’s deportability was that “a parapher-
nalia conviction ‘relates to’ any and all 
controlled substances, whether or not fed-
erally listed, with which the paraphernalia 
can be used.”46 The Court, however, again 
underscored the necessity of a categorical 
approach to analyzing the immigration 
consequences of criminal convictions, 
emphasizing that the INA’s controlled-
substance ground of removal applies only 
to noncitizens actually convicted of laws 
relating to the federally controlled sub-
stances that are listed in section 802 of 
Title 21.47 In particular, the Court was 
troubled by the “anomalous result” that 
minor paraphernalia offenses could trig-
ger removal more easily than offenses 
based on the actual possession or distribu-
tion of drugs, since those offenses support 
removal only if they necessarily involve a 
federally controlled substance.48
Thus, the Court again insisted on a 
“categorical approach” when considering 
the immigration consequences of criminal 
convictions, finding an insufficient match 
between the state conviction and the fed-
eral removal category in Mellouli’s case.
Notably, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for 
the majority endorsed the fact that as a 
consequence of the categorical approach, 
noncitizens in criminal proceedings might 
“enter ‘safe harbor’ guilty pleas” that avoid 
immigration sanctions.49 Indeed, Mel-
louli’s own plea seemed to have been an 
instance of this, in light of the deal struck 
and the amended complaint’s omission 
of the nature of the discovered pills in 
Mellouli’s sock. As it had done in Padilla, 
then, the Court in Mellouli endorsed the 
appropriateness of plea-bargain deals that 
help noncitizens avoid removal when sig-
nificant equities support their continued 
residence in the United States.50 
Mellouli and the Court’s other recent 
crime-based-deportation rulings aim to 
inject considerations of individual fair-
ness into the deportation process. Padilla 
pushes defense attorneys to seek safe 
harbors for their noncitizen clients, and 
prosecutors to weigh immigration-law 
consequences in exercising their discre-
tion to strike individualized plea deals. At 
the same time, decisions like Carachuri-
Rosendo, ???????????and Mellouli help pre-
serve the effectiveness of such criminal 
court deals in downstream removal pro-
ceedings, where back-end balancing is 
much constrained. 
The Limitations and Drawbacks 
of Enforcement-Based Equity
To be sure, a deportation system that re-
lies primarily on enforcement discretion 
for proportionality and fairness is far 
from ideal. One drawback of relying on 
enforcement discretion to keep the de-
portation system normatively justifiable 
is that executive actions in this area tend 
to arouse significant ire and controversy. 
States, congresspersons or members of 
the public may not approve of the par-
ticular manner in which the DHS man-
ages discretionary enforcement power, 
and may attempt to force modifications 
through legislation or litigation. We saw 
this dynamic at work in the criticism of, 
and challenges to, President Obama’s de-
ferred action initiatives. While the Court’s 
recognition in Arizona of the necessity of 
prosecutorial discretion as a vehicle for 
equity in immigration enforcement pro-
vides some support for categorical ini-
tiatives like DACA, the nature and scale 
of such programs complicates questions 
about their validity or desirability.
Another limitation is that the imple-
mentation of equity through enforcement 
discretion often does little more than pre-
serve the status quo. Deferred action and 
other forms of prosecutorial discretion 
typically do not resolve the underlying is-
sue that triggered the initiation of remov-
al proceedings. An undocumented youth 
who receives a reprieve under DACA, for 
example, remains without legal status and 
in legal limbo.
Finally, under any administration, the 
enforcement agency is unlikely to engage 
in much equitable balancing for nonciti-
zens with almost any criminal history. 
The immigration enforcement arms of 
the federal government have consistently 
pushed for the broadest and most severe 
interpretations of the criminal removal 
statutes possible. The Trump Adminis-
tration has broadened its conception of 
targeted “criminal aliens” to include even 
those who are arrested but not yet con-
victed.51 Even President Obama’s DACA 
program was foreclosed to anyone with a 
“significant misdemeanor,” regardless of 
other equities or mitigating factors.52
There are obvious political reasons 
for these kinds of enforcement choices. 
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Prioritizing noncitizens who have had 
run-ins with law enforcement is seen as 
an efficient means of sorting a very large 
pool of potential enforcement targets and 
plays well with most constituents. More-
over, criminal history provides the gov-
ernment with information reasonably 
assumed to be relevant to a noncitizen’s 
fitness to be a member of U.S. society, 
such as respect for law, dangerousness 
and economic productivity.53 
But not all noncitizens with convic-
tions, let alone arrests, are similarly 
situated. The deportation of noncitizens 
with criminal history will in many cases 
seem reasonable to most, but in many 
other situations it will be unjustifiably 
harsh in light of the relatively minor na-
ture of their conduct and individual mit-
igating factors like rehabilitation, length 
of time in the United States, community 
and family ties, age and health concerns. 
At the center of every deportation case, 
there is an individual who often has 
formed deep community bonds of fam-
ily, faith, employment and friendship. 
And where this is true, deportation re-
sults in life-altering consequences, both 
for that individual and for the family 
members, persons and institutions at the 
other end of those connections. 
The theme of much of the Supreme 
Court’s recent deportation jurisprudence 
is that even in a system of expansive de-
portation categories and constricted dis-
cretionary relief, the equities and impact 
of removal in the individual case must be 
considered in some way, even in cases in-
volving noncitizens with convictions. But 
the Court is not institutionally well-posi-
tioned to make a big enough difference. It 
is unlikely, in the near future anyway, to 
recognize any substantive proportionality 
right (whether in the immigration con-
text or elsewhere). The Court’s decisions 
mainly enable the possibility of norma-
tive balancing. Thus, this jurisprudence, 
although important, is perhaps best seen 
as a signal to the political branches that 
aspects of the deportation system are in 
significant need of reform. 
The most direct possibilities for re-
dress of the current system lie with Con-
gress. If federal lawmakers were to roll 
back the breadth and severity of the re-
moval grounds, and restore mechanisms 
for adjudicative relief from removal for 
both lawfully present and undocumented 
noncitizens, the pressure on the Execu-
tive to adopt measures that ensure indi-
vidual deportations remain proportional 
and justified would decrease. Until then, 
we can expect the Court to keep a steady 
diet of deportation cases on its docket, 
chipping away at the harshest edges of a 
system marked by insufficient formal op-
portunities for equitable balancing. ?
Prof. Jason A. Cade has 
taught at the University of 
Georgia School of Law since 
2013, where he is an 
assistant professor and 
director of the Community Health Law 
Partnership Clinic. Cade has published 
extensively in the field of immigration 
law, focusing primarily on the role of 
prosecutorial discretion and on 
intersections between criminal and 
immigration enforcement. Before 
joining the faculty at UGA Law, Cade 
was an immigration attorney in New 
York City and taught at the New York 
University School of Law. He can be 
reached at cadej@uga.edu.
Endnotes
1. 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015).
2. I have explored this material in more 
depth in a series of recent articles. 
See generally Jason A. Cade, Enforcing 
Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 661 (2015); Jason A. Cade, Judging 
Immigration Equity: Deportation and 
Proportionality in the Supreme Court, 50 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1029 (2017).
3. See Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(c), 
66 Stat. 163, 187 (formerly codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994)), 
repealed by Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
div. C, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 
3009-597 (1996); Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952, § 244, 66 Stat. 
163, 214 (formerly codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994)), repealed by 
IIRIRA, div. C, § 308(b), 110 Stat. 3009-
546, 3009-615.
4. See generally Jason A. Cade, Return 
of the JRAD, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
ONLINE 36 (2015), http://www.
nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/
NYULawReviewOnline-90-Cade.pdf.
5. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 
§§ 3 & 19, 39 Stat. 874, 875, 889.
6. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of 
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation 
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 469, 488 n.92 (2007).
7. In particular, see Anti-terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18, 28, and 49 U.S.C.), 
and Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 
3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in 
scattered section of 8 U.S.C.).
8. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) 
(2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (2012); 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2012).
9.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)–(b) (2012) 
(cancellation of removal for LPRs and 
non-LPRs); 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012) 
(asylum).
10. See, e.g., Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 
798 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(concerning the appeal of 42-year-old 
LPR in the country for 40 years who was 
deported as an “aggravated felon” after 
shoplifting $2 can of beer).
11. Jason A. Cade, Deporting the Pardoned, 46 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 355, 368–69 (2012).
12. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, 
Unauthorized Immigrant Population Stable 
for Half a Decade, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 
21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2016/09/21/unauthorized-
immigrant-population-stable-for-half-a-
decade.
13. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 
(1945) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
14. See generally Austin Lovegrove, 
Proportionality Theory, Personal 
Mitigation, and the People’s Sense of Justice, 
69 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 321, 330 (2010) (“[The 
severity of the punishment should 
be proportionate to the seriousness 
of the offence in question; but it also 
should be appropriate, having regard 
to the offender’s personal mitigation.”); 
Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law 
and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415, 416 (2012) 
(“Proportionality is the notion that the 
severity of a sanction should not be 
excessive in relation to the gravity of an 
offense.”).
IM
M
IG
R
ATIO
N
26      GEORGIA BAR JOURNAL
15. See, e.g., Kate Stith, The Arc of the 
Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the 
Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 
1420 (2008); William J. Stuntz, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).
16. Letter from 28 members of the U.S. 
House of Representatives to Janet Reno, 
Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, and 
to Doris M. Meissner, Comm’r, U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Servs. 
(Nov. 4, 1999).
17. See 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2012) (charging 
the Secretary of Homeland Security with 
“[e]stablishing national immigration 
enforcement policies and priorities”); 
8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2012) (conferring 
broad power to the Secretary 
of Homeland Security over “the 
administration and enforcement of this 
chapter and all other laws relating to 
the immigration and naturalization of 
aliens”).
18. Moreover, Congress’s immigration 
enforcement appropriation acts explicitly 
acknowledge—in fact, provide—that 
the Department of Homeland Security 
prioritize among noncitizens deportable 
on the basis of criminal history. See, 
e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 
5, 251 (2014); Consolidated Security, 
Disaster Assistance, and Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 
110-329, 122 Stat. 3574, 3659 (2009).
19. Serena Marshall, Obama Has Deported 
More People than Any Other President, 
ABC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2016, 2:05 PM), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
obamas-deportation-policy-numbers/
story?id=41715661.
20. See FY 2015 ICE Immigration Removals, 
U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/
removal-statistics/2015 (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2017) (showing that border 
deportations constituted at least two 
thirds of all removal orders from 2012 to 
2015).
21. Id. (showing that over half of deported 
persons in each year since 2010 had 
some kind of criminal conviction).
22. See Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing 
Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 
TUL. L. REV. 1, 31–34 (2014).
23. Id. at 32 (showing large differences in 
discretionary case closures between 
smaller courts (e.g., Charlotte, Seattle, 
Phoenix and Omaha), mid-sized courts 
(e.g., San Diego, Atlanta and Dallas), and 
large courts (e.g., New York City and 
Los Angeles)).
24. In late 2014, Homeland Secretary Jeh 
Johnson announced an expansion of 
DACA and the creation of Deferred 
Action for Parents of Americans 
(DAPA). DAPA would have operated 
in a similar fashion to DACA, 
extending temporary reprieves from 
removal for otherwise law-abiding 
parents of children with United States 
citizenship or permanent residence. 
In 2015, these expansions were 
preliminarily enjoined by a federal 
judge in Brownsville, Texas. The 
government’s appeal failed to convince 
a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, and on review the 
Supreme Court deadlocked 4-4, still 
down a member following the passing 
of Justice Scalia. See Texas v. United 
States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), 
?????, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
25. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
26. Id. at 2499 (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. See Jason A. Cade, Judging Immigration 
Equity: Deportation and Proportionality in 
the Supreme Court, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1029, 1043–46 (2017).
29. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The rarity of 
a constitutional holding in this area 
is underscored by the fact that even 
the Court’s substantive criminal law 
decisions are usually decided through 
subconstitional means. See Kate Stith-
Cabranes, Criminal Law and the Supreme 
Court: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of 
Byron White, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1523, 
1548 (2003).
30. Padilla, 559 S. Ct. at 360.
31. Id. at 361, 368 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 360.
33. Id. at 373.
34. Aggravated felonies make noncitizens 
subject to mandatory detention, 
ineligible for discretionary relief 
from deportation, and permanently 
prohibited from lawful return to the 
United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)
(A)(ii) (2012) (aggravated felony bar to 
lawful admission to the United States); 
8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(2)(B)(i) (2012) 
(aggravated felony bar to asylum and 
withholding of removal); 8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(a)(3) (2012) (aggravated felony 
bar to cancellation of removal for 
LPRs); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2012) 
(aggravated felony bar to cancellation of 
removal for non-LPRs).
35. See Jason A. Cade, The Plea Bargain Crisis 
for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1758–59 (2013) 
(providing examples). 
36. The two notable exceptions from the 
Court’s strict categorical approach, 
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009), 
and Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 
(2016), are the product of uniquely 
drafted deportation provisions and 
are also grounded in the Court’s 
proportionality concerns. See Jason 
A. Cade, Judging Immigration Equity: 
Deportation and Proportionality in the 
Supreme Court, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1029, 1069–71 (2017).
37. 560 U.S. 563, 575–79 (2010).
38. Id. at 579–80.
39. 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).
40. Id. at 1683.
41. Id. at 1684 (internal quotation marks and 
alteration marks omitted).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1693 (quoting Carachuri-Rosendo 
v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 573 (2010)).
44. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1983 
(2015).
45. Id. at 1985. 
46. Id. at 1988 (quoting Matter of Martinez 
Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. 118, 120 (BIA 
2009)). 
47. See id. at 1989.
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. at 1987.
50.  See also Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 
1479, 1492 n.10 (2012) (endorsing 
the idea that lawful permanent 
residents might “negotiate a plea to 
a nonexcludable offense,” allowing 
them to travel outside the U.S. without 
triggering immigration problems).
51. Memorandum from John Kelly, 
Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 
Enforcement of the Immigrant Laws 
to Serve the National Interest (Feb. 
20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_
Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-
to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf.
52. See generally Jayesh Rathod, 
Crimmigration Creep: Reframing Executive 
Action on Immigration, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 
173 (2015).
53. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The 
Second-Order Structure of Immigration 
Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 826–27, 846 
(2007).
